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Abstract 
ABSTRACT  
Post-uprisings Middle East politics is frequently described as a ‘regional cold war’ involving 
proxy warfare that emphasises the role of shared identities linking external and local actors. But 
does the ‘content’ of identities impact proxy war dynamics? This article considers the present 
‘battle for Syria’, a local con ict that became a theatre for multiple proxy wars involving actors 
emphasising identities on various levels, most notably national, religious/ sect and ethnic. It 
suggests that identity content does matter, with global powers more reluctant than regional 
players to back groups identifying at sub-national level, while foreign non-state actors are 




“What's in a name?  
That which we call a rose  
by any other name would smell as sweet" 
Juliet in Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet  
 
In Shakespeare’s classic Romeo and Juliet the young girl from the Capulets family rhetorically 
asks if it would make any difference if her beloved ‘rose’, Romeo from the Montegues family, had 
had another name. Are names – or identities - just empty labels, so that Romeo would still be the 
man Juliet loves if he had another name? While she believes so, as ’that which we call a rose by 
any other name would smell as sweet‘, the tragic ending of the famous love story does on the other 
hand suggest that names - and identities - sometimes make a difference.   
 The basic question raised by Juliet is not only relevant for loving couples from feuding 
families in Italy. It also links to a basic debate in the social sciences about identity politics: should 
different identities be treated as alike or does the ‘content’ of identities make a difference? While 
this fundamental question has not received much attention when it comes to how to grasp the 
dynamics of proxy wars played out in weak states with external and local actors subscribing to 
different kinds of identities, in this paper we are using the Syrian conflict to discuss whether, why 
and how it deserves more attention. 
From the very start, the Syrian uprising was marked by a complex interplay between 
domestic and regional factors, where rival international and regional actors supported various local 
‘proxies.’ The Syrian conflict represents an almost paradigmatic example of how a local conflict 
can be a theatre for multiple proxy wars involving a large number of different players.1 They not 
only vary as regards their status as global/regional/domestic and state/non-state. They also differ 
when it comes to the extent to which local and external actors are linked through shared identities 
and, not at least, the nature of these identities, e.g., religion, sect, tribe, ethnicity or nationality. In 
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the debates about the ‘battle for Syria’ much has been published on the role of identity and external 
involvement in shaping and driving the conflict. Disagreements have centred on whether identity 
tensions were the cause of the war or a product of it2 and over whether external actors have driven 
the violence or reacted to it.3  However, only limited attention has been focussed on the relationship 
between identity and external involvement. Do differences between identities matter when it 
comes to why and how external actors are involved and whether the domestic and international 
implications of their involvement are the same? For instance, do global powers get involved for 
the same reasons and in the same way as regional actors, who appear to draw more on identity 
claims? Do some kinds of identities appear to be more useful than others when external powers 
try to mobilize local proxies? Do some identities appear to be more/less constraining/enabling than 
others? And does the involvement of external actors drawing on different identity claims impact 
dynamics among local actors in similar or different ways? In other words, are “identities more than 
just a name” to paraphrase Shakespeare? 
 In the following, these questions are explored in two steps. The first part of the paper 
examines the general and Middle East-specific debates on proxy warfare. It shows how regional 
players and non-state actors and not at least identity politics have received increasing attention, 
but points at the same time to how this has not given rise to much reflection on whether differences 
in the ‘content’ of different identities impact the dynamics of proxy wars. By drawing on 
Brubaker’s analytical distinction between a ‘diacritical’ and a ‘normative ordering power’ 
understanding of identities, we suggest that this issue deserves more attention. In the second part 
of the paper, we are using the multiple proxy wars in the Syrian conflict as a ‘laboratory’ to 
examine whether and how the nature and content of identities make a difference for how regional 
proxy wars are played out, both when it comes to the distinction between sub, territorial-state and 
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supra-state identities and different kinds of trans-state identities. Based on a comparative analysis 
that explores the interaction between a selection of fighting groups in Syria emphasizing different 
kinds of identities and their interaction with outside actors we make several conclusions. Firstly, 
that identity content does seem to matter to outside powers, with global powers far more reluctant 
than regional players to back trans-state identity groups such as those based on religion/sect or 
ethnicity. Secondly, that regional states are also wary of such ties, and seek to moderate the slogans 
of the religious/sect fighters they back, to make them more exclusive. Finally, foreign non-state 
actors, like ISIS and the PKK, show less reluctance, less constrained by international opinion and 
reputation. 
The Politics of (different) Identities in (Middle Eastern) Proxy Wars 
As part of a discussion about external involvement in internal wars, Karl Deutsch half a century 
ago defined proxy wars as an ‘international conflict between two foreign powers, fought out on 
the soil of a third country, disguised as a conflict over an internal issue of that country, and using 
some of that country’s manpower, resources and territory as a means for achieving 
preponderantly foreign goals and foreign strategies’.4 Deutsch was mainly concerned with the 
‘global cold war’, i.e., the rivalry between the USSR and the United States, and his definition of 
proxy wars has subsequently been criticized for being too state-and global centric without 
sufficient attention to regional powers and non-state actors.5 Against this backdrop, Mumford 
among others, has suggested an alternative definition of proxy wars as an ‘indirect engagement 
in a conflict by third parties wishing to influence its strategic outcome’ through the provision or 
training of manpower such as co-opted militias or other irregular combatants, the provision of 
material or money or the sharing or dissemination of information.6 Based on this broader 
understanding, Mumford draws attention to how proxy wars are far from limited to the 
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US/USSR rivalry and he predicts that the 21st century will be marked by ‘the re-emergence of 
proxy warfare as a primary mode of intervention, violence and (dis)order’.7  
 While it is generally acknowledged that the notion of proxy wars is still useful, it is at the 
same time also recognized that proxy warfare of today differs from the “Global Cold War” era. 
According to Mumford, proxy conflicts will in the future increasingly be driven by regional 
powers and (in)formal “proxy coalitions” of both state and non-state actors,8 and Kaldor, among 
others, argues that actors will increasingly mobilize around ethnic, racial, or religious identities 
instead of previous emphasis on ideology so that identity politics will become an important 
dimension of future proxy wars.9  
Current Middle East regional politics seems to confirm this expectation. In the debate on 
how to grasp regional politics in the wake of the Arab uprisings it has become common to speak 
about the (re)emergence of some sort of “regional cold war.” An important component in this 
rivalry is the prevalence of proxy wars in conflict-torn, weakened and therefore permeable states 
with regional powers clashing indirectly through local proxies, who are mobilized through 
appeals to shared identities based on religion, sect, ethnicity or tribe.  
Contrary to the general debate on proxy warfare, this attention to regional players and not 
least to identity politics is nothing new in Middle East scholarship, where the role of (supra/sub-
state) identity politics has always had a prominent position in the agenda.10 Thus, there is a long 
tradition for perceiving the Middle East as a region marked by multiple identities in the sense 
that the territorial state identity has been challenged not only from below by sub-state identities 
but also from above by supra-state identities11, and the region has famously been described as a 
“vast sound chamber in which information, ideas, and opinions have resonated with little regard 
for state frontiers”.12 This has provided ample opportunities for proxy wars, in particular in the 
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context of weak states with permeable borders. Here, foreign powers have been able to use trans-
state identities to interfere and mingle in local conflicts (outside-in logic), and as a way of 
addressing the ‘ethnic security dilemma’13 local actors have used trans-state identities to seek 
support from the outside (inside-out logic).  
While Middle East scholarship may be very familiar with how identity politics influences 
proxy wars, there is still a gap in existing research, which need to be addressed in order to 
improve our understanding not only of dynamics of current Middle East politics, but also proxy 
wars in the 21st century more generally. Much of past and current debates on the role of the 
politics of identities in Middle Eastern proxy wars have been about how the origins and 
evolution of specific trans-state identities can best be explained. Today much of the attention 
concerns Shia/Sunni sectarianism,14 whereas it in the past was Arabism as reflected in 
discussions about how the idea of the existence of special bonds and obligations between Arabs 
had emerged, how it impacted Middle East politics and whether (Pan)Arabism was dead or if it 
had just transformed into new variants, maybe existing in parallel with territorial state 
identities.15 Another classic theme concerns the question about the relative importance for the 
rise of proxy wars of strong trans-state identities compared to the presence of weak states.16 In 
the current debate, this is reflected in a discussion on whether the current multiplicity of proxy 
wars across the Middle East region are caused by the rise of a “Shiite Crescent” or ‘an arc of 
state weakness and state failure running from Lebanon through Syria to Iraq.’17 
There is, however, yet another dimension related to the politics of identities in the current 
Middle Eastern proxy wars, which has received far less attention. As reflected in the various 
identity prefixes for the current regional rivalry, which has been labelled as a new 
Arab/Sectarian/Shia-Sunni/Iranian-Saudi/regional/Middle Eastern cold war,18 there also seems 
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to be multiple kinds of identities at play, when it comes to how different actors try to mobilize 
proxies. This raises the question if it makes a difference whether identities are based on religion, 
nationality, ethnicity, sect or tribe regarding why and how external actors are involved and 
whether the domestic and international implications of their involvement are the same? This 
question about possible implications of differences in the ‘content’ of different identities for the 
dynamics of regional proxy wars has not received much attention, but a brief detour to a related 
debate on identity politics suggests it should. 
In his discussion of ‘Religious Dimensions of Political Conflict and Violence’ Rogers 
Brubaker introduces a basic distinction between a ‘diacritical’ and ‘normative ordering’ 
understanding of identities.19 While his interest is specifically focused on religious identities 
compared to non-religious, his distinction seems also relevant for the present discussion about, 
whether differences in identities make a difference for the dynamics proxy warfare. According to 
a diacritical understanding, ethnic, religious, tribal or national identities can basically be treated 
as alike. Their relevance is limited to being a distinct marker useful for the drawing of borders 
between in-and out-groups, but they are basically ‘culturally empty’ in the sense that it is quite 
arbitrary which difference makes a difference. Conversely, the second understanding, which 
emphasises the normative ordering power dimension of (religious) identities, does instead direct 
attention to the content of specific identities. Thus, according to this perspective, identities have 
substance as they carry a normative dimension in the sense that they are associated with certain 
worldviews with implications for our notions about who we are, who likely friends/enemies are, 
what a threat is, who are under threat and who are threatening, what is appropriate behaviour etc. 
As a consequence, different identities cannot be treated alike and it is necessary to pay attention 
to what Brubaker – citing Barth – labels as ‘cultural stuff’. 
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Brubaker does not explicitly discuss how various kinds of identities may relate to proxy 
warfare, but the analytical distinction between a ‘diacritical’ and ‘normative ordering’ 
understanding of identities does also appear relevant for the present discussion. Thus, it raises the 
question about whether the nature and content of identities make a difference for how regional 
proxy wars are played out, both when it comes to the distinction between sub, territorial-state 
and supra-state identities and different kinds of trans-state identities (ethnic, sectarian, religious 
etc.)? These questions have not received much attention in past or current debates on proxy wars 
in the Middle East and more generally, so in order to remedy this gap in our knowledge about the 
place of identity politics in (Middle Eastern) proxy warfare, the remainder of this paper will turn 
to the Syrian conflict. It represents an almost paradigmatic example of how a local conflict can 
be a theatre for multiple proxy wars involving a range of actors emphasizing various kinds of 
identities. I this way, this conflict, metaphorically, almost constitutes an ideal ‘laboratory’ to 
study whether differences between identities make a difference, when it comes to why and how 
external actors are involved, and whether the domestic and international implications of their 
involvement are the same. 
Syria as a Laboratory – A Pandora’s Box of Wars within Wars 
Since its outbreak in 2011 the Syrian conflict has drawn in a range of local, regional and global 
actors, both state and non-state players, producing multiple parallel international proxy wars within 
the domestic struggles. At various points, the war reflected proxy battles between: Saudi Arabia 
and Iran; Saudi Arabia and Qatar; Iran and the US; Iran and Israel; Turkey and the PKK; Russia 
and the West; the West and the Islamic State; and Russia and the Islamic State20.  Moreover, 
identity has been a prominent feature of most of the groups fighting, sponsored and encouraged by 
these external players. Yet as the conflict has evolved, so have alliances, and several external 
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players have shifted sponsorship from one group to another. Such shifting sponsorship, and indeed 
the fact that others, such as Russia, remained consistent in the (national) identity groups they 
backed help to illustrate why the Syria conflict proves such as an interesting case study. Does the 
fact that external powers shifted from one group to another suggest one identity is more successful 
a mobiliser? Alternatively, does it tell us more about the identity of the sponsor than the group? Is 
the content of the identity important, or are the sponsors just pragmatically backing the groups 
they perceive as most successful in the hope of maximising their interests? 
The Syrian conflict began in March 2011. Syrians peacefully took to the streets to protest 
the rule of President Bashar al-Assad, in power since 2000.21 In the face of continued repression 
opposition militias formed to protect protestors and take on Assad’s forces. With Assad seemingly 
determined to crush the opposition militarily, by the end of 2011 Syria had descended into a civil 
war between Assad’s well-armed military and more poorly resourced rebel militias. In time, the 
conflict would be joined by two new forces: Kurdish fighters led by the PKK-aligned Democratic 
Union Party (PYD) pushing for autonomy, and the sinister Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) 
trying to build a ‘Caliphate’.22  
As anywhere, Syrians possessed multiple layers of identity, but from the conflict’s 
beginning identity politics was prominent.23 For decades, Assad and his father (President 1970-
2000) promoted a deliberately ambiguous identity that at different times highlighted Syrian 
national identity alongside Arab and Islamic supra-national ties.24 Sub-state ties were also 
indirectly fostered. The Assads were Alawi, a distant offshoot of Shia Islam, who made up roughly 
12% of Syria. While talking the language of shared Syrian and Arab identity, the Assad’s favoured 
members of their historically marginalised sect, placing them in powerful positions, especially 
within the military.25 This frustrated some Sunni Muslims, 74%26 of the population that had 
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traditionally ruled and now felt disempowered, even though the Assad regime did promote several 
prominent Sunnis. The Assads also wooed other non-Sunni minorities, including the 3% who were 
Druze Muslims and 8% who were Christians, presenting itself as a promoter of multi-faith 
secularism, but implicitly highlighting the difference between these groups and the Sunni majority. 
The Assads also continued the historical marginalisation of Syria’s Kurdish population, 9% of the 
population, denying them cultural rights and provoking a nascent Kurdish nationalism. The Assads 
were not the only ones promoting contrasting identities. Syrians consumed a range of domestic 
and external material emphasising different religious, supra-national and sub-state identities, 
particularly as satellite and Internet technologies improved.27  
For the analysis that follows, fighting groups have been selected over other units to analyse 
as they are more comparable than vaguer entities such as activists or crowds, plus they receive a 
clear indicator of external support in the form of arms and money. When the war broke out, a range 
of possible and prominent identities existed for such groups to emphasize and draw on: the national 
level, the religious/sectarian level; and the ethnic level. Many of the groups pushing these 
identities were consciously transnational – appealing beyond Syria’s borders for identity solidarity 
– yet others limited themselves to a Syria-centric view. Yet these levels did not translate neatly 
into political sides: it was not the case that everyone fighting for Assad pushed a national tie, 
everyone fighting for the rebels pushed a religious/sectarian identity, and everyone fighting for the 
Kurds promoted ethnicity. Rather, most received support from fighters promoting most identity 
levels. Assad, for example, had overtly national groups in the form of his army, the Syrian Arab 
Army (SAA), but also received considerable support from explicitly religious/sectarian Shia 
groups such as Hezbollah and the al-Fadl al-Abbas brigade.28  
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In terms of external engagement with and sponsorship of these groups, it is important to 
note their interactive nature, with both outside-in and inside-out dynamics present. On the one 
hand it was not the case that identity groups formed organically with no external input for foreign 
actors to then sponsor, but on the other they were certainly not simple proxies of outsiders bending 
to the will of international capitals. It is therefore necessary to examine this interaction between 
external and domestic forces.  
Comparing Syria’s Fighting Groups 
National 
Despite its characterisation as an ethno-sectarian conflict, the majority of fighters under arms in 
the Syrian conflict have fought for groups primarily claiming to represent national identity. By far 
the largest group was Assad’s military, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), which in 2015 was estimated 
to retain 125,000 troops, and its reserve paramilitary force, the National Defence Forces (NDF), 
believed to have up to 90,000 personnel.29 Similarly at its peak the opposition Free Syrian Army 
(FSA) was estimated to include militia that totalled 50,000 in 2013. The Pentagon estimated the 
same number fought in the US-supported Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) 
four years later.30 In contrast, the numbers fighting for groups drawing primarily on non-national 
identity such as religion or ethnicity was far smaller. While these non-national groups were often 
on the frontline of fighting and more visible, it is worth noting that players drew on national 
identity throughout the conflict – a tie that was never overcome or obscured even if others emerged 
alongside it. 
The largest fighting groups drawing on national identity were, unsurprisingly, the regime’s 
largest military institutions, the SAA and NDF. The SAA, as Syria’s military, existed long before 
the conflict began, founded in 1946. Like most armed forces it utilises symbols and slogans 
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emphasising national identity: its banner being the Syrian two-star flag, and its motto is ‘Nation, 
Honour, Devotion’. It suffered considerable desertions and defections during the war, particularly 
from Sunni Arabs, and its officer corps and elite units was dominated by Alawis. However, despite 
this demographic shift in its composition, the SAA remained ostensibly inclusive and saw no 
adoption of explicitly Alawi or non-Syrian slogans or regalia. The NDF was more complex. 
Founded during the war in late 2012 to organise the thuggish pro-Assad Shabiha paramilitaries 
into disciplined units, the NDF acted as an umbrella for multiple paramilitary militia. Some of 
these did emphasise a non-national character, such as explicitly Shia or Alawi groups, while many 
were local and often dominated by the sect or ethnicity predominant in a given neighbourhood or 
region. However, the NDF’s name and symbols remained explicitly national: the badge, for 
example, was a Syrian map with an aggressive fist daubed with the two-star flag.  
National identity also remained prominent among opposition fighting groups, although it 
faced a far stronger rival from various forms of Sunni Islamism and Jihadism. The FSA formed in 
Turkey in summer 2011 with consciously national slogans and symbols.31 Within months dozens 
of opposition militia emerged across Syria, declaring themselves part of the FSA.  Yet from the 
beginning the FSA faced a structural weakness: unlike the SAA, it was a newly established entity 
without a state apparatus behind it. Its nominal leadership had little direct control over the militia 
fighting in its name, something that various attempts to centralise command and control over the 
next few years failed to rectify.32 Instead, from the beginning a plethora of militia adopted 
consciously religious and sect-based identities, which they did not see as contradictory with their 
membership of the FSA. For example, in Homs, a hub of early rebel activity, within months of the 
FSA’s announcement, one brigade named itself after Khalid ibn al-Walid, a companion of the 
Prophet, and had a division named after the anti-Alawi preacher Adnan Arour.  
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The national discourse of Assad and his regime was unsurprising. As the incumbent in the 
Syrian conflict, Assad’s forces were fighting to preserve the pre-war status quo, so sticking with a 
pre-existing identity discourse made sense. Much of Assad’s approach was to pose as protector of 
minorities - the Alawis, other Shia, Druze and Christians - and of secularism, winning over a 
segment of secular Sunnis. To narrow his support by endorsing a purely Alawi identity could have 
been counter-productive. In contrast rebel forces were newly formed and less beholden to pre-
existing discourses. Unlike Assad’s multi-sect supporters, most rebel fighters were Sunni Arabs, 
making it less costly for their leaders to emphasise that identity.   
Interestingly, all external governments backing fighters in the conflict initially favoured 
groups with a national identity. Assad’s main allies, Russia and Iran, were quick to send material 
support to the SAA: Tehran had sent IRGC advisers by the end of 2011, while Moscow continued 
to sell weapons despite calls for an international arms embargo.33 As the conflict progressed 
Russia’s position did not alter, with the Syrian military being its main proxy even when Moscow 
directly intervened in 2015. Iran’s position was more nuanced and, as shall be discussed below, 
turned to non-national fighting groups, Shia militia, to shore up Assad from 2012 onwards. 
However, this was alongside not instead of national identity groups. Indeed, when given a major 
role in reorganising Syria’s military effort, Iran, with support from Hezbollah, constructed the 
NDF, giving it a national rather than a religious/sectarian identity. As with Assad, this may have 
been a pragmatic choice. While Iran successfully recruited Shia militia from Lebanon, Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight, there were very few indigenous Shia in Syria itself, barely 1% 
of the pre-war population. While these groups were mobilised along religious lines, narrowing the 
identity focus to just a Shia cause would have excluded other key Assad supporters to Iran’s 
detriment.   
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Assad’s main state enemies, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and the United States also 
initially backed national groups. Saudi Arabia and Qatar led public calls to arm the Free Syrian 
Army in February 2012 and by the end of that year both governments alongside Turkey and the 
CIA were facilitating the flow of money and weapons to the FSA. These governments made a 
concerted effort to make the FSA the leading rebel armed group, attempting to tie it to the exiled 
political opposition, the Syrian Opposition Coalition in November 2012 and arranging the FSA’s 
greater centralisation. The desire to push national groups was led by a fear of some Islamist militia 
among the rebels, particularly from the US and Saudi Arabia. Both were keen to ensure the former 
military men of the FSA toppled Assad rather than Islamists, tied to either al-Qaeda or the Muslim 
Brotherhood. However, it is notable that religious groups became more favoured as the war 
progressed. Qatar and Turkey were already pre-disposed towards the Muslim Brotherhood and so 
gave preference to their armed groups within the FSA early on, and later Salafist and sectarian 
groups like Ahrar al-Sham that rejected the FSA altogether. Saudi Arabia, though more cautious, 
also eventually turned to Islamists – the Salafist Jaysh al-Islam opposed to al-Qaeda, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the FSA, when it became clear that the FSA was not succeeding. It is worth 
noting that the US continued to sponsor groups nominally attached to the FSA or of a secular 
leaning, no matter how weak they ultimately proved on the ground.  
Fighting groups emphasising a national identity therefore were significant players 
throughout the conflict. Russia and Iran, sponsored Syria’s national military institutions, while 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the US initially backed opposition groups espousing national ties. 
The two global powers, Russia and the US, largely stuck to this formula, while the regional powers 
of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar, for various reasons, diversified their support to include 




More fighters may have formally stood under national banners, but the number of groups, 
emphasising religious and/or sect identity was far greater. While there were hundreds of religiously 
named fighting groups, here we will focus on a limited representative sample: two Shia groups in 
support of Assad, Hezbollah and al-Fadl al-Abbas brigade, two Sunni Islamist opposition groups, 
Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam, and two Jihadists, Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State in Iraq 
and al-Sham (ISIS).  
Both Hezbollah and al-Fadl al-Abbas brigade mobilised along religious/sect lines, but in 
different ways. The latter was more explicit, having initially formed specifically to defend the 
Sayyida Zeinab Shia shrine in south Damascus from rebel attacks. By mid 2013 up to 10,000 
Syrian and foreign Shia, especially Iraqi, had joined the brigade, which took its name from a son 
of Imam Ali.34 Hezbollah had been present in Syria before 2013, but its Secretary General Hassan 
Nasrallah only admitted this in April of that year. Again, using sectarian language in a televised 
speech he declared that defending the Sayyida Zeinab shrine was justification, while also blaming 
the US, Israel and Takfiris (radical Jihadist) for the war.35 However, Hezbollah’s position differed 
to al-Fadl al-Abbas brigade. Nasrallah, in emphasising the US and Israel’s supposed role in the 
conflict, which was limited in truth, was speaking to his supporters beyond the Shia, with 
Hezbollah long having positioned itself as a champion of Muslims, Arabs and anti-westerners in 
general.36 The al-Fadl al-Abbas brigade in contrast, were newly created, had a single purpose and 
was less concerned to nuance its slogans. 
Iran was closely involved in both militias dispatch to Syria. IRGC Quds Force commander 
Qassem Suleimani reportedly requested Nasrallah step up his involvement in 2013 and then 
coordinated the role of all Shia militia once in Syria. Iran’s reasons for turning to sect-based 
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fighters are manifold. Firstly, they had past experience of this working. Suleimani, who headed up 
Iran’s support for Assad, had spent the 2000s in Iraq and was instrumental in developing Shia 
militia there. Faced with the prospect of Assad’s collapse, calling on fighters from Iraq (and 
Lebanon) with battle experience and a track record of loyalty to Iran made sense. Secondly was 
the pragmatic component. In 2013 Assad was losing and Suleimani was unimpressed with his 
forces. “The Syrian army is useless!” he reportedly told an Iraqi politician, “give me one brigade 
of the Basij [Iran’s paramilitary irregulars] and I could conquer the whole country.”37 This explains 
both the reliance on external Shia militia and the desire to build a new entity, the NDF. Suleimani 
did select some NDF brigades, either Shia or Alawi, to be sent to Iran for political training, 
reportedly as a back up in case Assad did collapse.38 However, this was hedging. Iran utilised both 
Assad’s national forces and Shia militia to achieve its goals.  
Hezbollah, al-Fadl al-Abbas brigade and other Shia groups have appeared relatively 
consistent in their slogans, most likely as they are tightly controlled by Tehran. In contrast, the 
‘mainstream’ Sunni Islamist groups have undergone considerable evolutions, sponsored by 
outsiders but certainly not controlled. Ahrar al-Sham for example, began life in late 2011 sporting 
a black jihadist flag, with a declared goal to, “completely overthrow the Assad regime in Syria and 
build an Islamic state whose only sovereign, reference, ruler, direction, and individual, societal 
and nationwide unifier is Allah Almighty’s Sharia (law)” – framing itself as religious but 
national.39  The founder of Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam), Zahran Alloush, was more explicitly 
sectarian, stating he would, “cleanse the Levant of the filth of Rafidis and Rafidism [Shias],” and 
that, “the Shi'a are still despicable and pitiful through history”.40  
Both groups benefitted from non-state external support in the form of private donations, 
largely from individuals in the Gulf.41  Yet from the beginning, there were ties to anti-Assad 
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governments: Ahrar formed in Istanbul in 2012 with the likely knowledge of Turkish intelligence 
and received indirect aid from Turkish state charity IHH and Qatari government charities.42 As the 
FSA declined, both Doha and Ankara turned increasingly to Ahrar as its main proxy. At about the 
same time, especially after Barack Obama refused to intervene against Assad in September 2013, 
Saudi Arabia began to turn away from the FSA towards Jaysh al-Islam and Alloush, who’s father 
was an imam in Saudi. Yet their emergence as the main recipients of regional support contributed 
to a degree of moderation. Ahrar fought alongside Nusra for several years but eventually 
repudiated Al-Qaeda. Before then, with Turkish encouragement Ahrar rebranded, abandoning its 
black flag for a more moderate logo, reluctantly aligning with the exiled Syrian Opposition 
Coalition in 2015. Jaysh al-Islam, under Saudi tutelage moderated even more, with its leader 
Mohammed Alloush - who replace Zahran after his death in 2015 – becoming spokesman for the 
entire Syrian opposition. While there may be some correlation therefore between a watering down 
of religious slogans with greater support from foreign state powers, it should be noted that this also 
coincided with the decline in fortunes of the rebels, perhaps offering other reasons for inclusive 
language. 
The correlation between (relative) moderation and external state sponsorship is supported 
further when considering the two most extreme Jihadist fighting groups, Nusra and ISIS. While 
Qatar was accused of indirectly aiding Nusra and Turkey turned a blind eye to ISIS fighters 
flowing over its borders into Syria, there is no evidence that either government sought a formal 
relationship like that enjoyed with Ahrar.43 However both thrived on non-state external support. 
Both emerged from the same entity, Islamic State and Iraq (ISI), and were established from the 
outside unlike the other domestically originating rebel groups. Both appealed from the beginning 
to a transnational Sunni Muslim identity. Nusra emerged in early 2012 with an overtly sectarian, 
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Jihadist and anti-western ideology, setting it apart from the majority of rebel groups at the time. 
By late 2012 the group had ‘nationalised’, attracting mostly Syrian fighters from rival rebel groups 
with its leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, denying the group had a goal elsewhere than Syria.44 
This ideological shift may have been pragmatic, with Jolani recognising that most fighters attracted 
to Nusra had taken arms to fight Assad rather than join a transnational Jihad. It contributed to a 
split with ISI however, with Jolani refusing to subordinate to the newly created ISIS in 2013, but 
instead pledged his loyalty to Al-Qaeda.  
ISIS took up the banner of transnational Jihad, successfully freeing itself from the 
restrictive nation-state frameworks of other groups and appealing to all Sunni Muslims to join its 
newly declared Caliphate in 2014. As many as 27,000 foreign Muslims were estimated to have 
travelled to Iraq and Syria to fight for ISIS.45 Unlike other rebel groups, the goal was establishing 
a state, not specifically defeating Assad. This meant that ISIS was unique in being the only force 
speaking completely outside of the national framework. All other religious identity groups, even 
Nusra, were restricted by the pre-existing parameters of the nation state system. In most case this 
could partly be explained by the desire to balance the wishes of foreign government allies, but in 
Nusra’s case there were no state sponsors. On the one hand perhaps Nusra was tempered by ISIS, 
and had to move into a more moderate ideological position. Alternatively, Nusra might be seen as 
pragmatic and reacted to the realities it faced. 
Regional actors were therefore the principal sponsors of religious/sect groups and 
significantly shaped their role. The volume of Shia militia in Syria such as Hezbollah and al-Fadl 
al-Abbas brigade was primarily down to Iran who arranged their deployment, though also 
managed their ideological discipline. In contrast, Sunni opposition religious fighters formed 
more organically, but their fate and level of extremism was often influenced by external backing. 
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Forces backed by state actors, such as Ahrar and Jaysh al-Islam, moderated their slogans under 
external pressure, while radical Jihadists such as Nusra and ISIS were sponsored exclusively by 
non-state funds. 
Ethnic 
Ethnicity was a less significant mobiliser than religion or nation with one notable exception: 
Syria’s Kurds. The 10% of the pre-war population that were Kurds had good reason to turn on the 
Assad regime, which had historically discriminated against them. However, despite being mostly 
Sunni Muslims, the traditionally secular Kurds distrusted Islamists and Arab nationalists among 
the rebels. The Kurds were far from united however and rival political and armed groups emerged 
in the vacuum as Assad’s forces withdrew from the Kurdish heartlands. Quickly though, one force 
came to dominate: the PYD and its militias the YPG and YPJ. Though their main rival, the 
conglomerate Kurdish National Council, received some support from the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional 
Government, this was dwarfed by the level of training, weapons and finance coming to the PYD 
from its Turkish ideological ally, the PKK. This helped the PYD militarily dominate the Kurdish 
regions, declaring the autonomous region of ‘Rojava’ in late 2013. 
The evolution of the PYD’s identity discourse appeared the reverse of the opposition 
fighting groups. Opposition groups appealing to the nation were obscured by those looking to a 
narrow Sunni Muslim identity, while the PYD began with a narrow appeal to Kurds then later 
widened to appeal to the Syrian nation. They created a wider umbrella, the Syrian Democratic 
Forces (SDF) in October 2015 to bring non-Kurds onside. Whereas the PYD, YPG and YPJ 
retained traditional Kurdish flags and symbols of red, yellow and green, the SDF’s logo was 
consciously more inclusive: a map of Syria, with its name written in Arabic, Kurdish and Syriac. 
Similarly Rojava, which means ‘West’ in Kurdish implying it is the western province of a greater 
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Kurdistan straddling Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran, was renamed the ‘Democratic Federation of 
Northern Syria’ in 2016, another inclusive gesture.  
The external role in this was key. The SDF was formed after the PYD forged an alliance 
with the US against ISIS, with Washington keen to emphasise both the inclusive and democratic 
nature of its allies.46 This was also a means to limit the fallout from US ally Turkey who saw the 
PYD as an arm of the ‘terrorist’ PKK. This shift in rhetoric from the PYD might confirm the 
pattern seen with the Islamist opposition: external state backers nudging their proxies into 
moderation. 
Yet at the same time, some claim these shifts are superficial and the PYD remain primarily 
an ethnic militia. After all, the YPG/YPJ have not dissolved themselves into a single ‘national’ 
force, but remain separate as the best armed units in the SDF coalition. Though the SDF flag was 
raised after Raqqa was taken from ISIS in October 2017, soon huge posters of PKK leader 
Abdullah Ocalan were displayed in the city centre, fuelling fears of a PYD/PKK ascendency (MEE 
2017). Similarly, critics charge that the councils popping up to rule former ISIS areas conquered 
by the SDF are dominated by the PYD, while elsewhere cultural ‘Kurdification’ is being forced 
on non-Kurds.47 Some ask whether the US actually succeeded in shifting the PYD onto less ethnic 
focused, national and democratic ground.  
While the Kurds and PYD have been most significant, other more minor fighting groups 
have also mobilised along ethnic lines. Syria’s Assyrian Christian community, the principal Syriac 
speakers, consist roughly 400,000, and some formed ethnically-focused militia.48 The most 
prominent were the Syriac Military Council, which allied to the SDF and fought under the 
traditional Syriac colours of blue, red and yellow.49 At the same time, another, rival Assyrian 
group, the Sootoro, broke away from the Syriac Military Council in Qamishli province to fight for 
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Assad. They adopted a different logo, also using red, blue and yellow, but their official photos 
often included a two star Syrian flag as well. Given their tiny number, it is unsurprising that no 
external actor, nor the few hundred thousand fellow Assyrians in Iraq suffering even greater 
persecution in recent years, has sent support to either set of Syriac actors.  
Another smaller ethnic group were the Turkmen, living mostly in northern Syria along the 
border with Turkey. Like the Assyrians, several militia formed along ethnic Turkmen lines, largely 
on the opposition side.50 Unlike the Assyrians, the Turkmen militias received considerable external 
support from Ankara. In this case ethnic identity mattered greatly, as president Erdogan had long 
claimed that Turkey had a duty to protect ethnic Turkmen. As the war evolved and Turkey’s rebel 
proxies proved less reliable, more was invested in the Turkmen, seeing them as a guaranteed ally, 
despite having at most 5,000 fighters in total.51 In 2016 when Turkey created a new force to invade 
northern Syria to clear ISIS from its border, known as Euphrates Shield, various Turkmen militia 
under the banner of the Syrian Turkmen Brigades played a leading role. Turkmen wore light blue 
coloured armbands, a traditional Turkmen colour, to distinguish themselves from Arab fighters. 
However, even though Turkey has co-opted the majority of Turkmen militia fighters, it should be 
noted that ethnic solidarity with Turkey was not universal, and a handful of Turkmen militia allied 
with the SDF rather than Ankara.   
The PYD’s experience therefore reflected the difference between state and non-state 
sponsors observed above. When backed exclusively by a non-state actor, the PKK, they were more 
exclusionary, focusing on sub-state-Kurdish identity, but when they aligned with the US from 
2014 they ostensibly moderated their slogans to form a more inclusive, national entity. The 
Assyrians, in contrast, too insignificant to receive external support, remained exclusively ethnic. 
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The Turkmen, meanwhile, were backed heavily by Turkey despite being very small in number 
specifically because of their identity, suggesting that some identities do matter more than others.  
Concluding reflections…how identities are more than just a name 
In the beginning of this paper, we asked – paraphrasing Shakespeare - whether ‘identities are 
more than just a name?’ Against this background, we posed a series of questions on how external 
actors engage with local forces using different identities as part of proxy wars. We asked firstly 
whether global powers got involved for the same reasons and in the same way as regional actors; 
secondly whether some identities appear more useful than others when mobilize local proxies; 
thirdly if some identities appear more or less constraining or enabling; and finally, whether the 
involvement of external actors impacts dynamics among local identity-driven actors in similar or 
different ways?  
From this exploration of the different identities emphasized by fighting groups in the Syrian 
conflict and their interaction with outside actors, we can point to several notable observations that 
answer these questions and point to areas of possible future research. Firstly, regional powers were 
far more willing to back religious/sect based fighting groups than global powers. While all external 
powers began the war favouring nominally national-focused groups, over time the regional powers 
– Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey – turned to religious/sect-based fighters. In contrast the 
two main global powers, the US and Russia, but also the UK and France, continued to favour 
national groups. Indeed, in the case of the US, it insisted an ethnic-based proxy, the PYD, adopted 
a more national agenda, by becoming the SDF, to justify its support. 
This is a second notable observation: that external state actors tried to moderate their 
proxies. This is perhaps surprising, as state governments have frequently been accused of 
radicalising the fighters in Syria by sponsoring religious/sect groups. However, the picture is more 
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nuanced and once a relationship was established, governments sought to re-brand and moderate 
their allies. This was seen with Saudi Arabia and Jaysh al-Islam, Turkey with Ahrar al-Sham and 
the US with the PYD.  
In contrast, a third observation is that independent non-state actors tended to be more 
radical and exclusionary. This was certainly the case of ISI’s sponsorship of first Jabhat al-Nusra 
and then ISIS. Similarly, the PKK’s early support of the PYD coincided with its most Kurdish 
nationalist positions, before being publically tempered by the US. This might suggest that while 
state actors are constrained in whom they sponsor by concerns of international reputation, non-
state actors have no such impediments. 
In terms of further research, one area of interest to emerge has been what makes some 
identities more successful as the basis for fighting groups. In particular, it is curious that Kurdish 
ethnic identity was successfully mobilised to form a powerful and effective force in the PYD, 
while Sunni Muslim religious/sect identity produced a wider range of forces with mixed results. 
There are several possible explanations for this that require further study. It is possible that Kurdish 
nationalism was more coherent and easily importable, given its development in Iraq and Turkey 
in previous decades, while Sunni Muslim identity remains highly contested within the Islamic 
world with a range of competing Jihadist, Islamist and secular interpretations. Alternatively 
external actors may have played a role: the PYD benefitted from having only one patron, the PKK, 
for the early years of the war, while Sunni Muslim groups had Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, ISI 
and other private Gulf funders pulling them in different directions.  
Also of benefit in the future would be to compare the Syria conflict with other cases 
involving identity-based actors and their external backers. The Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, for 
example, would be an interesting comparison as they had a very different outcome. In the 1990s 
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leaders quickly abandoned Yugoslavian identity for those of Serbian, Croat, Slovene etc., while in 
Syria Bashar al-Assad and many of his opponents continued to promote a Syrian identity. Might 
this suggest that the Syrian identity has been more successfully established than the Yugoslavian 
tie, or is this more a consequence of demographic pragmatics: Yugoslavia’s ethnicities were 
geographically concentrated while Syria’s sub-state groups were more interspersed making 
exclusionary identities, such as Alawism, counter-productive. Alternatively, might we again look 
to external backers: the Yugoslav wars did not attract foreign interest and support until far later 
than in Syria, perhaps allowing for less early moderation in identity. Detailed comparisons with 
this and other cases could prove enlightening.   
While Romeo may have concluded that the solution to his and Juliet’s dilemma was to 
simply change his name and, ‘henceforth I never will be Romeo,’ the Syrian conflict suggests 
that identities, and the values external actors place in them, cannot be so easily dismissed. Yet 
this is not always the positive association assumed. Regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and 
Iran are not instantly drawn to sub-state sectarian proxies, but rather turn to them only after 
national groups appear to be failing. These sub-national identities are even more repellent to 
global actors like Russia and the US who, possibly to maintain their international reputations, 
strongly prefer backing national ties. Only sub-state groups, free from the constraints of 
international norms seem to immediately turn to sub-national identities.  
Reference 
Abboud, Samer N. (2015). Syria, New York: Polity. 
Abdo, Geneive (2017). The New Sectarianism : the Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi'a-
Sunni Divide, New York: Oxford University Press. 





Arpacik, Cihat, (2015). “Turkey, Syrian Turkmen team up to form United Turkmen Army,” Yeni 
Safak July 28 http://www.yenisafak.com/en/news/turkey-syrian-turkmen-team-up-to-form-
united-turkmen-army-2207584 [accessed 10/10/17] 
Balanche, Fabrice (2017) “From Qamishli to Qamishlo: A Trip to Rojava’s New Capital,” The 
Washington Institute May 8. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/from-
qamishli-to-qamishlo-a-trip-to-rojavas-new-capital [accessed 10/10/17] 
Barnard, Anne, Hwaida Saad and Eric Schmitt, (2015) “An Eroding Syrian Army Points to 
Strain”, New York Times April 28 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/world/middleeast/an-eroding-syrian-army-points-to-
strain.html?referrer [accessed 10/10/17] 
Barnett, Michael (1995). "Sovereignty, nationalism, and regional order in the Arab states 
system". International Organization, 49,  no. 3:479-510. 
Black, Ian and Dan Roberts, (2013). “Hezbollah is helping Assad fight Syria uprising, says 
Hassan Nasrallah,” The Guardian April 30 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/30/hezbollah-syria-uprising-nasrallah 
[accessed 10/10/17] 
Brubaker, Rogers (2015). "Religious Dimensions of Political Conflict and Violence". 
Sociological Theory, 33,  no. 1: 1-19. 
Chabkoun, Malak, (2014). “Syrian Revolution’s Path after Attacks on Ahrar al-Sham,” Al-
Jazeera September 17 
http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/09/20149147499306405.html [accessed 
10/10/17] 
Cockburn, Patrick, (2013). “West suspends aid for Islamist rebels in Syria, underlining their 
disillusionment with those forces opposed to President Bashar al-Assad,” Independent 
December 11 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/west-suspends-aid-
for-islamist-rebels-in-syria-underlining-their-disillusionment-with-those-forces-
8998891.html [accessed 10/10/17] 
Dawisha, Adeed (2003). Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Deutsch, Karl (1964). "External Involvement in Internal Wars’", in H. Eckstein (ed.) Internal 
War: Problems and Approaches. Free Press of Glencoe.  
Dickson, Janice, (2015). “Turkey turns blind eye to ISIS fighters using its hospitals: sources” 
Ipolitics May 27 http://ipolitics.ca/2015/07/27/turkey-turns-blind-eye-to-isis-fighters-
using-its-hospitals-sources/ [accessed 14/10/15] 
Droz-Vincent, Philip, (2014). “’State of Barbary’ (Take Two): From the Arab Spring to the 
Return of Violence in Syria.” The Middle East Journal 68.1; 33-58. 
Gause, F. Gregory (1992). "Sovereignty, Statecraft and Stability in the Middle East". Journal of 
International Affairs, 45,  no. 2:441-469. 
Gause, F. Gregory. (2014). "Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War". Brookings 
Doha Center - Analysis Paper. No.: 11. 
25 
 
Haid, Haid, (2017). “The Ramifications of the SDF Governance Plan for Raqqa Post-ISIS”, 
Atlantic Council May 11, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/the-
ramifications-of-the-sdf-governance-plan-for-raqqa-post-isis [accessed 10/10/17] 
Halliday, Fred (2000). Nation and religion in the Middle East. London: Saqi books.  
Hanau Santini, Ruth (2017). "A New Regional Cold War in the Middle East and North Africa: 
Regional Security Complex Theory Revisited". The International Spectator. 
Hashemi, Nader A. &  Danny Postel (eds.) (2017). Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics 
of the Middle East, London: Hurst Publishers. 
Hassan, Hassan, (2017). “ISIL and the numbers game: what exactly is the size of its army?” The 
National October 25 https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/isil-and-the-numbers-
game-what-exactly-is-the-size-of-its-army-1.670132 [accessed 1/11/17] 
Hinnebusch, Raymond (2005). "The Politics of Identity in the Middle East International 
Relations", 151-171 in  Louise Fawcett (ed.) International Relations of the Middle East. 
Oxford University Press: Oxford.  
Hokayem, Emile, (2013). Syria's Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant. London: Routledge. 
Hughes, Geraint Alun (2014). "Syria and the perils of proxy warfare". Small Wars & 
Insurgencies, 25,  no. 3: 522-538. 
Ismail, S. (2011). “The Syrian Uprising: Imagining and Performing the Nation.” Studies in 
Ethnicity and Nationalism 11, no. 3: 358–549. 
Jane’s Intelligence Review, (2016). “SDF Plays Central Role in Syrian Civil War,” Jane’s 
Defence Weekly January 
http://www.janes360.com/images/assets/333/57333/SDF_plays_central_role_in_Syrian_ci
vil_war__1_.pdf [accessed 10/10/17] 
Kirk, Ashley, (2016). “Iraq and Syria: How many foreign fighters are fighting for Isil?” The 
Telegraph March 24 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/29/iraq-and-syria-how-
many-foreign-fighters-are-fighting-for-isil/ [accessed 10/10/17] 
Koelbl, Susanne, et al. (2016). "Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Cold War of Islam". Spiegel Online. 
May 9.  Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/saudia-arabia-iran-and-
the-new-middle-eastern-cold-war-a-1090725.html  
Laborie Iglesias, M. (2013). “Syria: War, Sectarianism and Chaos.” In Geopolitical Overview of 
Conflicts 2013. Madrid: Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies. 
Landis, Joshua, (2013). “Zahran Alloush: His Ideology and Beliefs,” Syria Comment December 
15 http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/zahran-alloush/ [accessed 10/10/17] 
Lesch, David W., (2013). Syria: The fall of the House of Assad. London: Yale University Press. 
Lister, Charles, (2015). The Syrian Jihad. London: Hurst. 
Lund, Aron, (2013). “The Free Syria Army Doesn’t Exist”, Syria Comment March 16 
http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/the-free-syrian-army-doesnt-exist/ [accessed 1/2/15] 
26 
 
Lynch, Marc (2013). "The Entrepreneurs of Cynical Sectarianism", 3-6 in  POMEPS (ed.) 
POMEPS Studies 4: The Politics of Sectarianism. Washington D.C. 
(https://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/POMEPS_Studies4_Sectarianism.pdf) 
Lynch, Marc, (2006) Voices of the new Arab public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East politics 
today. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Mahmood, Mona and Martin Chulov, (2013). “Syrian war widens Sunni-Shia schism as foreign 
jihadis join fight for shrines,” The Guardian June 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/04/syria-islamic-sunni-shia-shrines-
volunteers [accessed 10/10/17] 
Malmvig, Helle (2017). "Wars within Wars: Regional Actors' Involvement in the Battle for 
Syria",  67-78 in  Rasmus Alenius Boserup, et al. (eds.) The Middle East and North Africa 
between regional autonomy and international intervention. Copenhagen/Beirut: 
DIIS/AUB.  
McCants, William, (2013). “Gulf Charities and Syrians Sectarianism,” Foreign Policy 
September 30 http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/30/gulf-charities-and-syrian-sectarianism/ 
[accessed 10/10/17] 
MEE and agencies (2015) “Who are the pro-Assad militias in Syria?” Middle East Eye 
September 25 http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/who-are-pro-assad-militias-syria-
2030619965 [accessed 10/10/17] 
MEE Staff, (2017). “Kurdish fighters raise flag of PKK leader in centre of Raqqa,” Middle East 
Eye October 19 http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/kurdish-fighters-raise-flag-showing-
pkk-leader-abdullah-ocalan-centre-raqqa-610840006 [accessed 1/11/17] 
Mumford, Andrew (2013). Proxy Warfare, Cambridge: Polity.  
New York Times, (2015). “Who are the Turkmen of Syria?” New York Times November 24 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/world/middleeast/who-are-the-turkmens-of-
syria.html?_r=1 
Noble, Paul (1991). "The Arab System: Pressures, Constraints, and Opportunities",  pp. 49-102 
in  Bahgat Korany & Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (eds.) The Foreign Policies of Arab States. 
Boulder: Westview.  
Phillips, Christopher (2012). Everyday Arab Identity - The Daily Reproduction of the Arab 
World, London: Routledge.  
Phillips, Christopher (2014). "The Arabism Debate and the Arab Uprisings". Mediterranean 
Politics, 19,  no. 1:141-144. 
Phillips, Christopher (2015). "Sectarianism and conflict in Syria." Third World Quarterly 36 no. 
2:357-376. 
Phillips, Christopher (2016). The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the new Middle East, 
New Haven: Yale University Press.  
Pierret, Thomas, (2017). “Salafi Jihadism and the Syrian civil war: National and international 
repercussions” in Cavatorta, F. & Merone, F. (eds), Salafism After the Arab Awakening: 
Contending with People's Power London: Hurst 
27 
 
Pinto, Paulo Gabriel Hilu (2017). “The shattered nation: The sectarianization of the Syrian 
conflict” in Hashemi, N. & Postel, D. (eds) Sectarianization: Mapping the new politcs of 
the Middle East London: Hurst  
Posen, Barry R. (1993). "The security dilemma and ethnic conflict". Survival, 35,  no. 1:27-47. 
Ryan, Curtis (2012). "The New Arab Cold War and the Struggle for Syria ". Middle East Report,  
no. 262:28-31. 
Salisbury, Peter (2015). "Yemen and the Saudi–Iranian ‘Cold War’". Chatham House - Middle 
East and North Africa Programme. No.: February 2015. 
(http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150218Ye
menIranSaudi.pdf)  
Salamé, Ghassan (1994). "The Middle East: Elusive Security, Indefinable Region". Security 
Dialogue, 25,  no. 1:17-35. 
Salloukh, Bassel F. &  Rex Brynen (eds.) (2004). Persistent Permeability? Regionalism, 
Localism, and Globalization in the Middle East, Aldershot: Ashgate.  
Salloukh, Bassel F. (2017). "Overlapping Contests and Middle East International Relations: The 
Return of the Weak Arab State". PS: Political Science & Politics, 50,  no. 3: 660-663. 
Stephens, Michael (2017). "The Arab Cold War Redux: the Foreign Policy of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council States since 2011", 73-104 in  Thanassis Cambanis & Michael Wahid 
Hanna (eds.) Arab politics beyond the uprisings : experiments in an era of resurgent 
authoritarianism. New York: The Century Foundation Press.  
Sullivan, Marisa, (2014). “Hezbollah in Syria” Institute for the Study of War April  
http://www.understandingwar.org/report/hezbollah-syria [accessed 12/5/15] 
Valbjørn, Morten &  André Bank (2012). "The New Arab Cold War: rediscovering the Arab 
dimension of Middle East regional politics". Review of International Studies, 38,  no. 1: 3-
24. 
Valbjørn, Morten (2009). "Arab Nationalism(s) in Transformation - From Arab Interstate 
Societies to an Arab-Islamic World Society", 140-169 in  Barry Buzan & Ana Gonzalez-
Pelaez (eds.) International Society and the Middle East - English School Theory at the 
Regional Level. N.Y.: Palgrave.  
Valbjørn, Morten (2015). "Introduction: The Role of Ideas and Identities in Middle East 
International Relations", vii-xxiii in  Morten Valbjørn & Fred Lawson (eds.) International 
Relations of the Middle East (Vol. 3: The Role of Ideas and Identities in Middle East 
International Relations). London: Sage.  
Van Dam, Nikolaos (2017) Destroying a nation: The civil war in Syria. London: IB Tauris 
Weiss, Michael and Hassan, Hassan (2015). Isis: Inside the Army of Terror New York: Regan 
Arts. 
Wright, Robin. (2013). "Imagining a Remapped Middle East". New York Times, September 28. 
Yassin-Kassab, Robin, and Al-Shami, Leila (2016). Burning country: Syrians in revolution and 
war. London: Pluto Press. 
28 
 
Ziadeh, Radwan, (2013), “Revolution in Syria: The Struggle for Freedom in a Regional Battle” 
93-112in Davis, John (ed.), Arab Spring and Arab Thaw: Unfinished Revolutions and the 
quest for Democracy. London: Routledge. 
1 Malmvig, ‘Wars within Wars’, 67. 
2 Abdo (2017) and Laborie Iglesias (2013) see Sunni-Shia tensions at the root of the conflict 
while Phillips (2015) and Pinto (2017) see challenge this, placing the emphasis on other factors. 
3 Phillips (2016) and Van Dam (2017) emphasize external actors among the drivers of the 
conflict in contrast to others, such as Hokayem (2013) and Yassin-Kassab and al-Shami (2016), 
who see external actors as being sucked in once the war has begun. 
4 Deutsch, ‘External Involvement in Internal Wars’,102. 
5 Mumford, Proxy Warfare, 1. 
6 Mumford, Proxy Warfare; see also Hughes, ‘Syria and the perils of proxy warfare’, 523. 
7 Mumford, Proxy Warfare, 8. 
8 Mumford, Proxy Warfare, 103. 
9 Kaldor, New and Old Wars, 7, 79-82. 
10 For an overview see Valbjørn, ‘Introduction: The Role of Ideas and Identities’. 
11 Gause, ‘Sovereignty, Statecraft and Stability in the Middle East’; Barnett,’ Sovereignty, 
nationalism, and regional order’; Hinnebusch, ‘The Politics of Identity in the Middle East’. 
12 Noble, ’The Arab System’, 56. 
13 Posen, ’The security dilemma and ethnic conflict’. 
14 Hashemi and Postel, Sectarianization; Wehrey Beyond Shia and Sunni. 
15 Phillips, Everyday Arab Identity; Valbjørn, ‘Arab Nationalism(s) in Transformation’; 
Dawisha, Arab Nationalism. 
16 Salloukh and Brynen, Persistent Permeability; Gause, ‘Sovereignty, Statecraft and Stability in 
the Middle East’; Salamé, ‘The Middle East: Elusive Security’. 
17 Gause, ‘Beyond Sectarianism’; Salloukh, Overlapping Contests and Middle East International 
Relations; Wright ‘Imagining a Remapped Middle East’. 
18 Gause, ‘Beyond Sectarianism’; Ryan ‘The New Arab Cold War’; Stephens, ‘The Arab Cold 
War Redux’; Santini, ‘A New Regional Cold War’; Salisbury ‘Yemen and the Saudi–Iranian 
‘Cold War’; Koebl ‘Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Cold War of Islam’;  
19 Brubaker, ’Religious Dimensions of Political Conflict and Violence’, 5. 
                                                 
29 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
20 Abboud, Syria; Hokayem, Syria’s Uprising; Phillips, Battle for Syria; Malmvig, ‘Wars within 
Wars’. 
21 Lesch, Syria 69-86. 
22 Lister, The Syrian Jihad, 221-260. 
23 On multiple layers of identity, see Halliday, Nation and Religion, 48-51. On early displays of 
identity see Ismail, “The Syrian Uprising.” 
24 Phillips, Everyday Arab Identity; Phillips, Battle for Syria. 
25 Droz-Vincent, ‘State of Barbary’. 
26 65% were Sunni Arab, 10% Sunni Kurds  
27 Lynch Voices of the new Arab public, 1-28. 
28 Sullivan, ‘Hezbollah in Syria’. 
29 Barnard, Saad and Schmitt, ‘An eroding Syrian Army’; MEE, ‘Who are the pro-Assad 
militas’. 
30 Cockburn ‘West suspends aid’; Kenner and O’Toole ‘The Race to Raqqa’. 
31 Ziadeh, ‘Revolution in Syria’, 98. 
32 Lund, ‘The Free Syrian Army’. 
33 Phillips, Battle for Syria, 149. 
34 Mahmoud and Chulov, ‘Syrian war widens Shia-Sunni schism’ 
35 Black and Roberts, ‘Hezbollah is helping Assad’. 
36 Valbjorn, ‘Arab nationalism(s)’, 165-167. 
37 Phillips Battle for Syria, 161. 
38 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS, L2044. 
39 Chabkoun, ‘Syrian Revolution’s Path’. 
40 Landis, ‘Zahran Alloush’. 
41 McCants, ‘Gulf charities’. 
42 Pierret, ‘Salafi Jihadism’. 
43 Dickson, ‘Turkey turns blind eye’. 
44 Pierret, ‘Salafi Jihadism’. 
45 Kirk, ‘Iraq and Syria’; Hassan, ‘ISIL and the numbers game’. 
30 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
46 Jane’s Intelligence Review, ‘SDF plays central role’. 
47 Haid, ‘The Ramifications of the SDF’; Balanche, ‘From Qamishli to Qamishlo’. 
48 al-Abed, ‘Syria’s Assyrians’. 
49 al-Abed, ‘Syria’s Assyrians’. 
50 New York Times, ‘Who are the Turkmen’. 
51 Arpacık, ‘Turkey, Syrian Turkmen team up’. 
